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UTAH STA TE RETIREMENT 
BOARD, an agency of the 




Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for benefits under the Judicial Re-
tirement Act. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court awarded the Respondent, Mrs. Elton, 
the benefits provided by the Judicial Retirement Act. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Mrs. Elton seeks affirmance of the decision of the 
lower court. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mrs. Elton does not accept the statement of facts pro. 
posed by the Appellant. 
The Appellant has artfully singled out those facts 
which it believes support its position and has studiously 
avoided those facts which support the decision of the 
lower court. 
It should not at this time require citation of author-
ity for the proposition that on appeal the evidence is 
viewed in the light most favorable to the decision of the 
lower court, but if it does, see Hardy v. Henricksen, No. 
12354, Supreme Court of the State of Utah, filed March 
16, 1972. 
As her Statement of Facts, Mrs. Elton submits the 
following: 
Judge Leonard Elton was appointed to the bench of 
the Third Judicial District in 1966 after a distinguished 
career as a trial lawyer (R. 64). At that time he was in 
good health (R. 64, 119). There were no indications of 
physical impairment. He was not then and had not for 
many years been under medical care (R. 178). 
On January 9, 1969, Judge Elton suffered a stroke 
(R. 79). He was hospitalized for a time and then returned 
to part-time employment. By the fall of 1969 he had re· 
sumed his judicial duties and was working full-time (R. 
47, 55, 65, 81). 
2 
On January 1, 1970, he assumed the responsibilities 
of Presiding Judge. These responsibilities substantially 
increased his workload. 
The Presiding Judge has general supervmon over 
the functions of all 10 District Courts of the Third Ju-
dicial District. He presides over meetings of the District 
Judges. He supervises and controls calendar assignments, 
personnel problems, questions relating to the press and 
usually personally handles cases that involve constitu-
tional issues, if they can be sensed initially, and cases 
of unusual public interest (R. 66). 
From the time he resumed his fall judicial duties 
until April 20, 1970, Judge Elton saw his doctor monthly 
without complaints or medical findings (R. 81). On April 
21, 1970, he came to Dr. Dalrymple's office complaining 
of dizziness. He was clammy, unsteady in gait and had 
experienced nausea and vomiting (R. 81-82). 
The events leading to the conditions of April 21, 
1970, are significant: 
On Monday, April 6, 1970, Judge Elton passed sen-
tence upon Clark Ronnow on one count of misusing pub-
lic funds and dismissed six other counts (Ex. P-2). 
City officials through newspaper comments had at-
tempted to tell Judge Elton what he ought to do in the 
Ronnow case and from the bench he told them that if 
they wanted to tell him what to do, they had better ap-
pear in court on the sentencing date (R. 68-69). 
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On Wednesday, April 15, Judge Elton started trial of ' 
Woodward v. Anderson, a 60-car freeway accident. Be. 1 
tween April 6 and April 15, Judge Elton had had a full 1 
schedule of trials and hearings (Ex. P-2). 
The Woodward case continued through Thursday, 
Friday and Monday, April 20 when the jury returned with 
its verdict at 9: 11 p.m. (Ex. P-2). 
The next day, on April 21, Judge Elton made a 
special visit to Dr. Dalrymple. As previously noted, the 
Judge was dizzy, clammy, unsteady and nauseated (R, 1 
81, 82). Dr. Dalrymple believed he had suffered a stroke. 
(R. 88). 
He stayed home ill the 21st and 22nd (Ex. P-4). On 
the 23rd he heard Motions in the Sunday Closing Law 
Case (Ex. P-2). 
On Friday, April 24, Arbor Day, he heard extensive 
argument in the Sunday Closing Law Case (Ex. P-4). 
On Monday, April 27, Judge Elton was again home 
ill (Ex. P-4). He saw Dr. Dalrymple on Tuesday. He 
was not good. The doctor insisted he stay home a week. 
(R. 88, 122). 
Judge Elton stayed home April 28th, 29th and 30th 
and May 1st. The hearing in the Sunday Closing Law 
Case set for April 29, was postponed until May 6 (R. 122). 
His illness required him to postpone the announced date 
for decision. This resulted in several "nasty" telephone 
calls which really upset him (R. 125). On May 2 he again 
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saw Dr. Dalrymple. He was not well. He was unsteady 
and his speech was slurred (R. 55). 
On Wednesday, May 6, Judge Elton heard final 
arguments in the Sunday Closing Law Case. On Monday, 
May 11 he started another jury case. On May 12 he ruled 
on the Sunday Closing Law Case, started a non-jury case 
and heard an annulment and divorce (Ex. P-3). He had 
a jury case scheduled for May 13 but died that morning. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT IS 
SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
The defendant states as points that Judge Elton died 
as a result of disease and not as result of accident and that 
his stroke did not arise out of or occur in the course of 
his employment. 
These are not legal points on appeal. They are state-
ments of position and arguments against the finding of 
the lower court. The issue presented by this appeal is 
simply whether the findings of the lower court are sup-
ported by competent evidence. Charlton v. Hackett, 11 
Utah 2d 389, 360 P.2d 176 (1961). 
In this connection, the trial court was entitled to 
consider both the medical and the non-medical evidence 
and to apply that evidence under guidelines established 
by the decisions of this court and other persuasive author-
ities. 
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The finding complained of reads: 
"Judge Elton was killed by accident arising 
out of or in the course of his employment" (R. 27), 
There was an abundance of evidence to support this 
finding. 
The persons who knew him best - his wife, his 
colleagues, his clerk, his bailiff and the lawyers who prac. 
ticed before him - all bore witness to the deterioration 
of his health brought upon by the stresses of the highly 
sensitive cases handled by him during the last six weeks 
of his life. 
His physician, Dr. Dalrymple, testified that Judge 
Elton suffered from vascular disease, resulting in 
insufficient blood supply to the brain, and that this condi· 
tion was aggravated by the stresses o Judge Elton's em· 
ployment and that these stresses were the principal factor 
in cutting short his life (R. 90-92). 
said: 
In his report to the Retirement Board, Dr. Dalrymple 
"It is my opinion that Judge Elton's cerebral 
thrombosis, which occurred on May 13, 1970, was 
of sudden onset and undoubtedly precipitated by 
the emotional tension which he underwent in the 
performance of his judicial duties." (Ex. P-1). 
Mr. Harry J. Calton, Judge Elton's Bailiff described 
Judge Elton's health as "always good" (R. 46). He said 
the judge applied himself to his work diligently (R. 48). 
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In describing the public interest in the Ronnow Case 
and the Sunday Closing Law Case, Mr. Calton said: 
"Well, it was immense. There was a terrible 
lot of interest. He had telephone calls and letters. 
I don't know the nature of them because I didn't 
read them. He was under a lot of pressure." (R. 
48). 
Mr. Calton observed that while Judge Elton had 
these cases under consideration, he worked usually from 
8:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. and took work home with him 
(R. 48). He worked a number of Saturdays (R. 49). 
While the Sunday Closing Law Case was under con-
sideration, Judge Elton had visitors in the office "all the 
time." Every time he had a recess, it wasn't a recess for 
him, according to Mr. Calton, as he had attorneys and 
civilian people in there putting pressure on him (R. 49). 
The judge became onery whereas he had been a "very 
gentle man" (R. 49). He looked tired (R. 49). 
David J. Shewell, Judge Elton's Clerk, recalled that 
the case of State of Utah v. Ronnow had been assigned 
to Judge Anderson (R. 56). He disqualified himself (R. 
56). Judge Elton discussed the case with other judges 
but no one wanted it. He said he didn't want it either but 
couldn't make someone else take it, so he kept it (R. 57). 
The Sunday Closing Law Case was also an unpopular 
case. Judge Elton did not feel he could assign it to some-
one else (R. 57). 
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Mr. Shewell recalls that during this case there were 
continual calls and quite a bit of mail and attorneys wait-
ing for the judge as he recessed court (R. 58). Judge 1 
Elton was concerned (R. 58). He did a lot of reading (R. 
58). He said he had been bothered at home and had con-
sidered unlisting his phone number (R. 59). 
When Judge Elton read his decision from the bench, 
the courtroom was full. There was quite a bit of emotion 
in his voice (R. 59). He was under considerable strain but 
agreed to a television interview at noon. 
When he came off the bench at noon his chambers 
were full of lights and cameras, and cords and micro· 
phones. He could not get to his desk. He returned to the 
courtroom and said he was not going in his chambers. 
Before lunch he did go back and read his decision for the 
reporters (R. 60). When he came back from lunch, he 
was choking. He appeared nervous. 
While Judge Elton had the Sunday Closing Law Case 
under consideration, his speech was not clear and sharp, 
he fumbled for words which was not like him (R. 61). 
Mr. Shewell recalled the freeway accident case. It 
involved 60 cars on a snow-slick road. They worked 
late at night; the case was a strain on the judge (R. 61, 
62). 
Harold Waldo, Jr., one of the principal attorneys in 
the Sunday Closing Case, testified that the case had "very 
great public interest." (R. 135). There was a hearing on 
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Arbor Day (April 24) by which a procedure for the han-
dling of the case was agreed upon (R. 136). On May 6, 
the court heard arguments of counsel starting at 10:00 
a.m., continuing until noon, resuming at 2:00 and con-
tinuing until 5:00 (R. 137). In the morning the Judge 
asked questions but as the afternoon proceeded the num-
ber of questions declined. He appeared to be fatigued, 
withdrawn and worried (R. 138). During the afternoon 
he interrupted counsel in the middle of a sentence to call 
a recess, abruptly (R. 138). 
On the day he announced his decision (May 12) it 
was noteworthy that he was fatigued and seemed to be 
extremely tired. He ascended the bench slowly. He took 
considerable time to get to the chair. His voice was low 
and subdued, where he normally had a booming voice that 
carried very well. On this occasion it was difficult to 
hear him. He announced his decision in a few words and 
left the bench (R. 138-139). 
Judge Elton was an independent-minded judge. He 
at no time gave the impression that it didn't matter be-
cause his decision would be reviewed. The constitutional 
point involved was particularly difficult (R. 141). 
Mrs. Elton testified that Judge Elton always worked 
from about 8 until 5 and always brought files home (R. 
120). After he became presiding judge he spent even 
more time and his lunch hours were often spent working 
(R. 121). 
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Judge Elton had many calls at home during the Ron. 
now case (R. 121), and during the Sunday Closing Case. 
He became markedly irritable in April (R. 122). When 
he went in for his check-up (April 20), Dr. Dalrymple 
told him to take it easy and rest a bit. The hearing was 
postponed to May 6 (R. 122). 
On May 5 he had been studying but he couldn't re-
member what he was doing. He insisted that his children 
and his wife sit up with him until 3:00 a.m. because, he 
said, "I have lost my memory completely." (R. 123). 
The following weekend he worked on the Sunday 
Closing Case (R. 123). He had promised the decision by 
Tuesday, having previously announced that he would 
make the decision earlier (R. 125). 
On the 12th of May, Mrs. Elton met her husband for 
lunch, but she could not get into his chambers because 
it was full of cameras and newspaper men (R. 126). He 
said, "I am not going to do it." She said, "Leonard, just 
give a brief statement and get it over with," so he did 
(R. 126). Although he had planned to meet Mrs. Elton 
for lunch. He had lunch with an attorney and she picked 
him up that evening (R. 127). He had a stroke the fol-
lowing morning (R. 127). 
Judge Elton was under no strain during the six weeks 
before his death other than his work (R. 128). He had no 
financial problems (R. 129), no marital problems (R. 
I 27), no problems with the children (R. 129). 
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Dr. Dalrymple testified that from January 13, 1969, 
until his death Judge Elton was suffering from an under-
lying vascular disease (R. 86). When Dr. Dalrymple saw 
Judge Elton April 20, his condition was good (R. 50). 
On the 21st, Dr. Dalrymple was of the opinion that the 
judge had suffered another stroke (R. 88). He prescribed 
a week off. 
He next saw Judge Elton on April 28. His condition 
was not much better. He changed his medication because 
he was becoming more irritable and hypersensitive and 
asked him to return on May 2nd (R. 88). 
On that date he still didn't seem very well. He was 
unsteady, his speech was slurred. He asked him to return 
again in one week. On May 9 he had improved. On May 
13 he was on the verge of death when Dr. Dalrymple 
saw him at the hospital. He died in a matter of minutes 
(R. 89). 
From March until May, Judge Elton appeared to be 
under stress or tension (R. 189). Judge Elton acknowledg-
ed he was tired and under stress (R. 94). This stress in 
the opinion of the doctor aggravated the underlying dis-
ease and contributed to his death. In the opinion of the 
doctor, this aggravation was the principal factor in bring-
ing about Judge Elton's death (R. 92). 
Dr. Dalrymple said that Judge Elton had the potenti-
ality for a stroke before April 21, 1970, but" ... he had 
something happen between the 20th and 21st that caused 
it which I couldn't say precipitated it, but I know what 
happened." (R. 102). 
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Dr. Dalrymple said: 
"Those people who work under a lot of pres. 
sure have a very high incidence of vascular dis. 
ease: attorneys, doctors, high business executives 
and there are certain factors which make them 
more vulnerable to the disease of the arteries, but 
we don't know them." (R. 109). 
The legal structure within which this evidence is to 
be considered is the Judicial Retirement Act which pro-
vides: 
"Disability retirement compensation - Wid-
ows' pensions. - Any judge who has had ten years 
of service and who is retired on grounds of dis· 
ability pursuant to Section 49-7-8( d) shall be en· 
titled to the disability retirement compensation 
provided for in this act. Any judge, regardless of 
the years of service, whose disability arises out of 
or in the course of performance of his judicial 
duties and the widow of every judge who is killed 
by accident arising out of or in the course of his em· 
ployment, wheresoever such injury occurred, shall 
be entitled to the disability retirement compensa· 
tion or widows' pensions, respectively, provided 
for in this act." Section 49-7-4, U.C.A., 1953. 
The Utah Workmen's Compensation Act employs 
language identical to that found in the Judges' Retire-
ment Act. Several cases construing the Workmen's Com· 
pensation Act of Utah support Mrs. Elton's right to a 
widow's pension. 
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140, 
427 P.2d 740 ( 1967), involved a fireman who suffered a 
mild heart attack because of anxiety he experienced dur· 
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ing an alarm, but did not seek medical aid until six 
months later when he experienced similar pains. He 
claimed that a pre-existing heart ailment was aggravated 
by his duties as a fireman. 
His doctor testified before the Commission that acute 
stress, strain, and emotional aggravation could have 
aggravated an underlying or pre-existing coronary artery 
difficulty. The Commission, however, denied compensa-
tion based on the report of a medical panel. The panel 
felt that the events of the evening of the fire showed no 
more emotional tension than that of many other fires 
that had been the usual part of his occupational duties for 
four years prior and that progression was a natural part 
of the course of coronary artery disease. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed, saying that the 
fact there is no direct evidence the plaintiff suffered great-
er anxiety and emotion than usual is not determinative 
whether an industrial accident occurred, that aggrava-
tion of a pre-existing disease by an industrial accident is 
compensable and that an internal failure brought about 
by exertion in the course of employment may be an acci-
dent within the meaning of the act. 
In Jones v. Calif. Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 
P. 2d 530 (1952), a pea vinery supervisor worked long 
hours on several successive days. The work was not par-
ticularly strenuous physically but there was much mental 
stress. He became ill while at work, went home and died 
shortly thereafter as a result of a coronary occlusion. The 
Commission denied compensation. 
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The Supreme Court ruled that compensation should 
have been granted, saying: 
"It is settled beyond question that a pre-exist-
ing disease or other disturbed condition or defect 
of the body, when aggravated or lighted up by 
an industrial accident, is compensable under the 
act, Graybar Electric Co., Inc. v. Industrial Comm., 
73 Utah 568, 276 P. 161; Thomas D. Dee Memorial 
Hospital Ass'n. v. Industrial Comm., 104 Utah 
61, 138 P.2d 233. And also that an internal failure 
brought about by exertion in the course of em-
ployment may be an accident within the meaning 
of Sec. 42-1-43, U.C.A., 1943, without the re· 
quirement that the injury result from some inci-
dent which happened suddenly and is identifiable 
at a definite time and place. Robertson v. Indus-
trial Comm., 109 Utah 25, 163 P.2d 331; Thomas 
D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n. v. Industrial 
Comm., supra,- Hammond v. Industrial Comm., 
84 Utah 67, 34 P.2d 687; Purity Biscuit Co. v. In-
dustrial Comm., 115 Utah I, 201 P.2d 961, 966. 
In the latter case, Mr. Justice Wade stated: 
'* * * this court is definitely committed to 
the proposition that where an employee suf· 
fers an internal failure or breakdown which 
results from overexertion in the course of his 
employment that such is a compensable acci· 
dent injury * * *' Citing cases." 244 P.2d 
at 642. 
Several other jurisdictions have granted compensa· 
tion in similar factual situations. In Lumbermen's Mutual 
Casualty Co. v. Ind. Accid. Comm., 29 Cal. 2d 492, 175 
P.2d 823 (1946), the California Supreme Court held that 
arterial hypertension and arterial apoplexy brought on 
by long working hours is a compensable injury. All rea-
14 
sonable doubts whether an injury arose out of the em-
ployment are to be resolved in favor of the employee. 
The Court stated that a heart attack brought on by strain 
and overexertion incident to employment is a compensable 
injury though the condition existed previously and even 
though there was no traumatic injury. The Court also 
held that there is no requirement of unusual strain -
only a casual connection between the strain of the em-
ployment and the injury suffered need be shown. 
In Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co. v. State Ind. Accid. 
Comm., 39 Cal. 2d 831, 250 P.2d 148 (1952), a compensa-
tion award was upheld by the Supreme Court where the 
claimant suffered a stroke. Shortly before he had worked 
65 days for 11 hours per day in an atmosphere of strain 
and tension attempting to conclude contract negotiations. 
The medical testimony showed that the long hours 
coupled with the tense and trying condition which sur-
rounded them could have aggravated an existing hyperten-
sion which in turn could precipitate a cerebral vascular 
accident. The Court said it realized that the point of the 
stroke is reached through the cumulative effect of each 
day's strain and that it cannot be said that any one par-
ticular exposure to strain and tension was responsible. 
Despite no traumatic accident, the Court upheld the com-
pensation award. 
Hoage v. Royal Ind. Co., 90 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 
1937), held that an insurance adjuster who had worked 
long hours and worried over his work and, as a result, 
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suffered a heart attack, should not be denied compensa. 
tion. Mental strain was deemed sufficient to justify the 
award. 
In Rathbun v. Taber Tank Lines, 283 P.2d 966 
(Mont. 1955), compensation was granted to the widow 
of a truck driver who died of a heart attack. He had work-
ed long hours, did not get regular sleep, and was driving 
on icy roads. The evidence was deemed sufficient to 
show the driver suffered from an employment connected 
m1ury. 
In Schechter v. State Ins. Fund., 160 N.E. 2d 901 
(N.Y. 1959), an attorney or an insurance company died 
from a heart attack. His workload had increased signifi-
cantly in the weeks preceding his death. He was under 
constant strain. The Court of Appeals ruled that com-
pensation should be granted if a claimant was under un-
usual strain by his employment despite the fact that the 
work performed by him which precipitated the heart fail-
ure is the same general type in which he is regularly in-
volved. So long as unusual strain is placed on the claimant 
by his work so that his heart is affected, the requirements 
for compensation are met. 
In Klimas v. Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc., 176 
N.E. 2d 714 (N.Y., 1961), compensation was granted an 
employee who died of a heart attack. Emotional strain 
over an excess repair bill for an aircraft of his employer 
caused his death. The New York high court ruled that 
the death was employment connected. 
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In Little v. ]. Korber & Co., 71 N.M. 294, 378 P.2d 
119 (1963), Irving Little became emotionally upset at 
work as manager of a wholesale department of a hard-
ware store. He died shortly after of a myocardial infrac-
tion due to arterio-sclerotic heart disease due to general-
ized arteriosclerosis. The trial court held that his death 
was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course 
of his employment. The Supreme Court of New Mexico 
affirmed, saying: 
"* * * Where a case is tried by the court 
without a jury, the court is the sole judge of credi-
bility of witnesses and weight to be given their 
testimony. * * * 
"It has long been the rule that in determining 
whether evidence is sufficient to sustain the trial 
court's findings of fact, this court on appeal will 
consider only that evidence and inferences to be 
drawn therefrom which support the findings, and 
we will not consider any evidence unfavorable to 
the findings. The findings of the trial court will 
not be disturbed when they are supported by any 
substantial evidence and this court will not weight 
the evidence where conflicts exist. * * *" 
The only other case in Utah construing the Judicial 
Retirement Act is the case styled In the Matter of the Re-
tirement of Horace C. Beck, (Utah 3d Judicial District, 
Civil No. Misc. 4-64, 1969). In that case District Judge 
Bryant H. Croft said: 
"Judge Beck, at 76, undoubtedly has been 
subject to 'the aging process.' The fact that a heart 
condition is sometimes caused, as Dr. Behrens 
noted, by an aging process should not, of itself, 
bar one from disability retirement compensation. 
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Under Utah law a judge is entitled to such com. 
pensation if his disability arises 'in the line of duty' 
or as a result of 'the performance of his duty.' Dr. 
Behrens' report stated that while he did not feel 
that Judge Beck's work as a judge is primarily 
responsible for the basic heart problem, he did 
believe that the work as a judge had certainly 
aggravated the condition and helped to precipitate 
congestive heart failure in the sense that increased ' 
physical activity and pressures of such a position 
do contribute to increase the work load of the 
heart. As a judge, this writer has difficulty in 
recognizing that the duties of a judge necessarily 
increases one's 'physical activity,' but the pres-
sures and tensions present in the role of a judge 
is a matter of which this writer feels compelled to 
take judicial notice. 
"Prior to becoming a judge, Judge Beck had 
enjoyed excellent health, had no prior indication 
of heart disease, and was and is a tall, thin man 
not burdened with the excess weight which 
prompts doctors to suggest reducing to avoid heart 
problems. Nothing is in the record to suggest that 
Judge Beck has at any time done anything, except 
to grow older graciously, in the performance of his 
duties as a judge, that could be construed as the 
causal responsibility for the heart condition that 
now compels his retirement. A disability that 
evolves from such ailments as a stroke or heart 
attack appears to me to be the end product of a 
gradual process hastened in its arrival time in 
some cases by the extra stresses and strains that 
required activities cause. In such cases the question 
as to whether such disability came in the line of 
duty cannot depend for its answer upon the timing 
of the heart attack that brings the disease to its dis-
ability climax. Whether it comes in the courtroom 
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or the bedroom, in chambers or in the kitchen, 
should make no difference in the conclusion to be 
reached. 
"The heart, like the filament of the globe, 
works for thousands of hours, then suddenly, per-
haps without even the flick of a switch, fails in 
its function. The cause, in the absence of evidence 
to the contrary, is not the last act of the moment 
preceding the attack, but in all probability is the 
summation of many elements contributing each in 
its own way over the years to the end result. 
"When we are confronted with the necessity 
of determining the causal connection between dis-
ability brought on by heart disease and the per-
formance of one's duty, an important element is, it 
seems to me, not so much what caused it, but rath-
er what did not cause it. In Judge Beck's case, the 
only thing that seems certain is that we cannot say 
that his heart attack occurred as a result of some 
affirmative act on his part that had no connection 
with his duty as a judge and was of his own doing. 
We could not determine with any degree of med-
ical certainty all of the factors that contributed to 
the ultimate result that occurred on March 16, 
1969. Perhaps no one factor 'caused' it. That the 
tensions and pressures of the judge's duties could 
be and probably was a contributing factor seems 
evident from Dr. Behrens' report. 
"Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., stated 
that, 
'The life of the law has not been logic; it 
has been experience.' 
"Experience shows that heart failures come 
from the grinding of day-to-day living and work-
ing. When it finally fails from no more than a 
flick of the switch, it seems reasonable to believe 
that the tensions in the life of a judge over a span 
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of years preceding the attack constitute a con. 
tributing factor of more than de minimis propor. 
tions and, in turn, constitutes a causal connection 
between the resulting disability and the 'line of 
duty' and in Judge Beck's case, I so find. 
"It is, therefore, my conclusion that Judge 
Horace C. Beck, because of physical illness, has 
become substantially and permanently incapacitat. 
ed to perform the duties of his office, that as a 
consequence thereof, he is disabled and should be 
placed in a retirement status and his office be deem. 
ed vacant, and that Judge Beck became disabled in 
the line of duty, or as a result of the performance 
of his duty, and is entitled to the disability re-
tirement compensation provided for in the Judges' 
Retirement Act." 
Judge Beck's heart attack occurred at the Elks Lodge. 
His case was not appealed. 
Appellant's Point I on cause of death is an argument 
as to the weight of the evidence and the permissible in· 
ferences therefrom. Such arguments are for trial courts, 
not appellate courts. The same arguments were made to 
Judge Erickson and were properly rejected by him. 
Appellant's thesis seems to be that Judge Elton's 
underlying disease was not caused by his employment. We 
have never said it was. Our position has been and is that 
the stresses of his employment, acting upon his underlying 
disease, cut short his life. 
The lives of all of us will end some day. To be 
killed is not to have one's life ended; it is to have one's 
life shortened. Even though Judge Elton may have died 
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from vascular disease at some point in time, if that point 
was accelerated by employment connected stress, he was 
killed by accident arising out of his employment as surely 
as the consumptive miner killed in a cave-in. 
Justice Crockett noted the difference between heart 
attack cases and back cases in his concurring opinion in 
Redman Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 22 Utah 
2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969), a back case relied upon by 
the Appellant. He did not join in the court's comments 
about ]ones v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 
244 P.2d 530 (1952), and Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial 
Comm., 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949), saying: 
"They are different from the instant case and 
speak for themself ." 
Pintar v. Industrial Comm., 14 Utah 2d 276, 382 
P. 2d 414 (1963), also relied upon by Appellant is another 
back injury case. It merely holds there was evidence to 
support the Commission's findings. 
Carling v. Industrial Comm., 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 
P.2d 202 ( 1965 ), a loss of hearing case cited by Appellant 
is actually against the Appellant's position. The court 
there expressly recognized that the term accident " ... is 
not necessarily restricted to some single incident which 
happened suddenly at one particular time and does not 
preclude the possibility that due to exertion, stress or 
other repetitive cause, a climax might be reached in such 
manner as to properly fall within the definition of an 
accident . . ." 
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Nor do Mellen v. Industrial Comm., 19 Utah 2d 373, 
431 P.2d 798 ( 1967), or Burton v. Industrial Comm., 13 
Utah 2d 353, 374 P.2d 439 (1962), support Appellant. 
In Mellen the medical panel reported that Mellen's onset 
of pain while roofing was only symptomatic of a natural 
degenerative condition. The Commission denied compen. 
sation even though Mellen's personal physician thought 
that the onset was due to extra exertion on the roof. The 
court held only that the Order was based on competent \ 
evidence. In Burton, the medical panel found that Burton's I 
myocardial infraction was not caused by exertion. The 
Commission so held. This court held the Commission did 
not act arbitrarily. 
These cases are better authority for Mrs. Elton's posi· 
tion than for Appellant's. In this case we have medical 
testimony from Dr. Dalrymple that Judge Elton's death 
was due to the stresses of his work as a judge and a total 
absence of testimony to the contrary. 
Dr. Roger M. Dalrymple was licensed to practice 
medicine in 1943 (R. 75 ). He has specialized in internal 
medicine for the past 23 years, having previously spent 
three years in the army in internal medicine, two years at 
the University of Utah and having been certified by the 
American Board of Internal Medicine in 1952 (R. 75). 
He is on the staff of St. Mark's Hospital and University 
Hospital and is Assistant Clinical Professor of Medicine 
at the University of Utah (R. 76). 
The Appellant offered no evidence to rebut the testi· 
mony of Dr. Dalrymple. Indeed, Appellant offered no 
evidence at all in this case (R. 144). 
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Appellant's Point III relative to course of employ-
ment is wholly unsupported by relevant authorities. They 
all involve the question whether employees are covered 
while going to or from work or during lunch. None are 
heart attack or stroke cases. 
The fact that the fatal stroke occurred at home rath-
er than on the bench is irrelevant. Section 49-7-4, U.C.A., 
1953, provides it applies " ... wheresoever such injury 
occurred. . . ." 
Appellant cites authorities to establish that it is ir-
relevant that death occurs on the job if there is no causal 
relation between the employment and the death. These 
same cases also establish the corollary, i.e., if there is a 
causal relationship between the employment and the 
death, the death arises out of the employment whether 
or not in the course of the employment in the sense of 
time and place. See all the authorities relied upon by 
Appellant under its Point III. 
CONCLUSION 
A judge does not unburden himself of the responsi-
bilities of his office when he walks out of the courthouse. 
He takes his decisions home with him and frequently to 
bed with him. The fact that a decision has been reached 
does not remove this burden. The agony of decision is 
not so easily cast aside. Second thoughts and recurring 
doubts are part of the daily life of the conscientious judge. 
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The Utah State Retirement Act created the Retire. 
ment Board which administers the Judges' Retirement 
Fund. That Act provides: 
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the 
legislature that this act be liberally construed so 
that the benefits and protections as herein provid-
ed shall be extended as broadly as reasonably 
possible." Section 49-10-7, supra. 
Mrs. Elton is entitled to her pension. The defendant 
should be required to pay her the compensation provided 
by law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
AND HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN 
7th Floor, Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 




NEWLY UNCOVERED CASES 
The fact that Judge Elton's fatal attack 
occurred after he had made his decision in 
the Sunday Closing Law case does not affect 
his widow's right to her pension. In Thompson 
v. American Casualty co., 20 Utah 2d 418, 439 
P.2d 276 (1968), the plaintiff was under con-
siderable stress during the five.weekdays but 
rested at home on Sa~urday and took a short 
drive to visit relatives. He was stricken 
that night after returning home during his 
sleep. 
Even though a person has· a diseased · 
condition which would eventually result in 
his death, if an accident occurs which 
hastens his death, recovery can be had. 
Whitlock v. American Insurance Co., 21 Utah 
2d 131, 442 P.2d 26 (1968). 
Determination of cause of death is the 
exclusive prerogative of the factfinder. Id. 
See also Dienes v. Safeco Life Ins. Co., 
21 Utah 2d 147, 442 P.2d 468 (1968). 
